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Abstract 
This article draws upon insights from democratic and social theory to demonstrate that the findings 
of traditional opinion surveys exert an unjustified and unhealthy level of dominance in the 
contemporary political sphere. It reflects upon the plausibility of imagining that the expanded use 
of deliberative approaches to understanding public opinion might halt and begin to reverse the 
penal excesses generated by ‘penal populism’. It is argued that the findings from studies utilising 
deliberative methods struggle to have any significant impact on political decision making because 
proponents show an unwarranted epistemological deference which means that survey-based 
approaches are able to retain their dominance of political conceptions of the so-called ‘reality’ of 
public opinion. This is because deliberative methods are regarded and portrayed as producing 
findings which are less ‘real’ than the findings generated by traditional survey-based research. Even 
the proponents of deliberative methods collude in this portrayal by invoking the notion of the 
‘hypothetical public’, an ‘ontological red herring’ which distracts from both the socially constructed 
nature of all representations of public opinion, and the unwarranted power which accrues to and 
flows from conventional methods. 
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Penal populism, deliberative methods and the production of ‘public opinion’ on 
crime and punishment  
Introduction 
Recent decades have seen criminologists analysing what many regard as perturbing trends in 
criminal justice policy and practice in Anglophone jurisdictions, particularly those policies and 
practices which seem to underpin a drift towards mass incarceration. Characterizations and 
explanations of the current state of the criminal justice landscape are myriad and often conflicting, 
but the idea that there has been a ‘punitive turn’ (cf. Hutton, 2005: 243) has gained general 
acceptance as an analytical focal point for contemporary criminology, despite some prominent 
notes of dissension (for example see Matthews, 2005).   
Most aspects of the increasingly punitive action taken against offenders are regarded as 
incompatible with criminological evidence, and thus also irrational (e.g. see Brereton, 1996; Roberts 
et al, 2003; Tonry, 2004; Young, 2003; Young and Matthews, 2003). Some criminologists fear that a 
wholesale cultural shift has deemphasized the importance of the goal of rehabilitating offenders, 
substituting a ‘New Penology’ (Feeley and Simon, 1992); a ‘post-correction’ age (Bauman, 2000: 
212); an increase in ‘confinement without the aspiration of reformation’ (Rose, 2000: 334); or a 
‘Culture of Control’ (Garland, 2001). All of these characterizations of contemporary trends in 
criminal justice are difficult to reconcile with the traditional aims and content of criminological 
knowledge.  
In England and Wales the Ministry of Justice’s analysis of the reasons for the dramatic increase in 
the prison population between 1993 and 2009 (from 44,246 to over 86,000) has acknowledged that 
‘tougher sentencing and enforcement outcomes’, as a result of new legislation and changes in 
policy have played a key part. In particular the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences, 
indeterminate sentences for public production and changes to the way breaches of non-custodial 
sentences and licencing conditions are dealt with led to increases in the proportion of offenders 
sentenced to immediate custody, longer average sentence lengths and more recalls to prison 
(Ministry of Justice, 2013). These changes appear to illustrate the tendency of the UK government 
to seek to win the support of voters by promising to cast their nets of social control ever wider, and 
tighten their rhetorical and physical ‘grip’ on criminal offenders in increasingly punitive ways, 
regardless of what the evidence tells them about the likely long-term outcome of adopting this 
approach.  
Whether criminologists and other experts are being marginalized altogether in the criminal justice 
policymaking process, or whether understandings of expertise are simply diversifying, is a matter of 
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some debate (see Matthews, 2005: 189). However, it is generally accepted that over the last three 
decades, as political debates about crime and justice have become more heated, politicians have 
paid increasing attention to representations of the views of ordinary members of the public. The 
terms ‘populist punitiveness’ (Bottoms, 1995) and ‘penal populism’ (Roberts et al, 2003) have been 
used to describe an apparent tendency for some politicians to cynically seek political advantage in 
this way.  
Some point to the positive democratic aspects of politicians responding to public sentiment (see 
Ryan, 1999; 2003), however others have warned that, due to the distorted media coverage of crime 
and criminal justice, the public are woefully misinformed about the facts of crime and justice, and 
therefore their opinions should be treated with caution (e.g. see Roberts et al, 2003). Research 
carried out in the 1980s suggested that policymakers were relying on inadequate survey 
instruments to understand how the public think and feel about the criminal justice system (see 
Doob and Roberts, 1984; Hough and Moxon, 1984; Roberts and Doob, 1989). More recently it has 
been suggested that the survey method per se is not to be trusted, and that some form of 
‘deliberative methods’ ought to be preferred (e.g. see Dzur (2012); Dzur and Mirchandani (2007); 
Green (2006, 2008); Loader (2008; 2011)).  
The purpose of this article is to reflect upon the plausibility of imagining that the expanded use of 
deliberative approaches to understanding public opinion might offer some respite from the 
apparent excesses of ‘penal populism’. Despite some compelling arguments and evidence having 
been advanced which suggest that engagement in deliberative processes may indeed encourage 
participants to moderate punitive attitudes (which I won’t revisit here), I argue that the findings 
from studies utilising deliberative methods will continue to struggle to have any significant impact 
on political decision making unless proponents adopt a more assertive approach to their promotion. 
The primary reason for this, I suggest, is that deliberative methods are regarded and portrayed as 
producing findings which are less ‘real’ than the findings generated by traditional survey-based 
research, a portrayal in which even the proponents of deliberative methods actively collude by 
invoking the notion of the ‘hypothetical public’. This unwarranted epistemological deference means 
that survey-based approaches are able to retain their dominance of political conceptions of the so-
called ‘reality’ of public opinion and that the ‘penal-populism calculus’ (see Green, this volume) 
retains its vice-like grip on the criminal justice landscape.  
The article draws upon insights from democratic and social theory to demonstrate that the findings 
of traditional opinion surveys exert an unjustified and unhealthy level of dominance in the 
contemporary political sphere. It concludes that this dominance needs to be challenged on moral, 
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rather than epistemic grounds, and that such a challenge could make space for the greater use of 
deliberative methods, which may in turn to undermine the incentives which exist for politicians to 
engage in ‘penal populism’. 
The ‘hypothetical public’ 
Deliberative methods are said to provide a ‘glimpse of a hypothetical public’ (Luskin et al, 2002: 
458), which is to say they provide a ‘glimpse’ of the way a public assembled according to normative 
ideals drawn from deliberative democratic theory behaves. Because such a public is glimpsed only 
through the consciously applied mechanism of the deliberative method it is noted that deliberation 
delivers something which is ‘deliberately produced’ (Loader, 2011: 357), as researchers attempt to 
‘model what the public would think, had it a better opportunity to consider the questions at issue’ 
(Fishkin, 1995: 162, emphasis added). Thus, the (trademarked) ‘deliberative poll’ advocated by 
Fishkin (2009: 27) is said to meld ‘normative theory with an empirical agenda – to use social science 
to create quasi-experiments that will uncover deliberative public opinion’.  The clear message here 
is that citizens cannot ‘achieve public judgment unassisted’ (Green, 2006: 145). They require the 
‘treatment’ which the deliberative pollster provides so that ‘raw’ and ‘debilitated’ ‘actual’ opinion 
can become ‘refined’ and ‘deliberative’ ‘counterfactual’ opinion (Fishkin, 2009). According to these 
descriptions then, the deliberative poll provides a true representation of a normatively ideal reality 
which does not exist outside of the research context, hence the ‘hypothetical public’. 
To think and write about deliberative methods in this way is to take as a basic point of reference the 
idea that there is an already existing and knowable ‘actual’ reality of public opinion, which is 
objectively captured using alternative (non-deliberative) methods. The implication is that there are 
methods through which public opinion ‘as it is’ can be accurately ‘mirrored’, as opposed to being 
‘filtered’ through the refining action of deliberation (Fishkin, 2009: 17). This ‘mirroring’ conception 
of public opinion is clearly discernible in those research studies which purport to ‘measure’ or 
‘gauge’ actually existing public opinion about criminal justice institutions and their actions. 
Researchers working on studies cast in this mould are likely to take the view that deliberative polls 
are an interesting intervention, which might prove to be what Hough and Park (2002: 182) call a 
‘useful adjunct’ to ‘the standard representative poll’. However deliberative polls, and other more 
experimental methods (for example providing survey respondents with specific sentencing 
scenarios), are deemed useful only in so far as they enable researchers ‘to assess the “mechanics” of 
opinion formation’ (Walker and Hough, 1988: 14). The implication from both traditional survey 
researchers and deliberative pollsters, then, is clear: public opinion (‘raw’, ‘debilitated’, ‘actual’) 
exists, it is real, it can be measured and its ‘mechanics’ understood. This encourages us to think 
about the difference between traditional surveys and deliberative polls as one of science versus 
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political aspiration, of actual existence versus normative experiment, of real versus unreal, of 
objective versus subjective.  
Yet a whole school of thinking about the ontological and epistemological status of social scientific 
knowledge refutes the basis for this distinction, arguing that social scientists can never provide 
objective, value-free descriptions of the social world, as they themselves are engaged in living in 
and constructing the world they seek to describe. According to this view meaningful reality is 
constructed through human interaction and activity: ‘social phenomena are not there to be 
encountered but are continuously produced by people actively engaged in all sorts of projects’ 
(Harré, 1998: 39).  As such, ‘public opinion’ is a socially constructed category of ‘thing’ which has 
been brought into being through purposeful human activity, is sustained by human activity, and 
impacts upon human understanding and activity. In other words, to quote a democratic theorist, 
‘the will of the people is not properly regarded as an object to be discovered’ (Richardson, 2002: 61).  
If we accept this view (which I do) then traditional survey-style research and analysis on public 
opinion, no less than deliberative polls, must create the ‘public’ whose views it purports to 
represent. In other words, traditional survey-style research is no less implicated in the production of 
a ‘hypothetical public’ than are deliberative polls, and the implicit contrast between ‘real’ (survey-
measured) public opinion and ‘unreal’ or ‘ideal’ (deliberatively-produced) public opinion is clearly an 
ontological red herring. 
The idea of the ‘hypothetical public’ is a red herring because it directs attention away from the 
manner in which power is amassed, retained and exercised through the dominant survey-based 
approaches to studying public opinion. To neglect the operation of power in this area is to fail to 
acknowledge the way in which certain approaches to researching ‘public opinion’ are all the time 
enacting and strengthening a particular form of ‘democratic’ project, and are therefore (albeit 
unintentionally) stifling attempts to articulate and realize a different kind of democratic vision (such 
as the vision which animates the arguments put forward by deliberative democrats).  
The rise of the opinion poll  
There are of course significant differences between different types of ‘opinion poll’. ‘Self-selecting’ 
newspaper, magazine and website polls of their readers are rightly considered to be less reliable 
than the representative opinion polls conducted by large polling organizations (which feature 
frequently in the news media). And few would dispute that the (usually) much more substantial, 
sophisticated and methodologically robust attitude surveys conducted by academic researchers 
(sometimes on behalf of or in collaboration with government departments) should generally be 
regarded as superior to either of these. However there are enough similarities between these types 
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of poll to suggest that though they may be extremely varied in terms of methodological quality and 
robustness, what they share in terms of techniques and underlying assumptions, makes it possible 
to think of them collectively as constituting a particular approach to the matter of ‘public opinion’.   
Specifically these approaches are all (1) quantitative, emphasising the aggregation of individual 
views; (2) focussed on the general (e.g. the criminal justice system, or ‘sentencing’ or ‘the police’) 
rather than the specific (e.g.police or judicial conduct in particular cases); (3) premised on an 
individualised conception of the public as atomised who hold (and are entitled to hold) in isolation 
from others their own ‘personal’ opinions or attitudes; and (4) content to permit their participants to 
express their opinions in the  passive, non-interactive way which is typical of the survey method. For 
the sake of simplicity, then, I refer to this approach as the Aggregative General Individual Passive 
(AGIP) approach to understanding public opinion.  
During the 20th century AGIP approaches became the dominant method for understanding ‘public 
opinion’, displacing the classical understanding of public opinion as a phenomenon formed and 
expressed in the context of social interaction. The data produced by surveys were frequently 
presented as ‘the only workable empirical rendering of public opinion’ (Price and Neijens, 1997: 
336). Early pioneers of ‘opinion polling’ understood their work as helping to increase democratic 
participation (Price and Neijens, 1997: 336). Speaking at the first conference on Attitude and 
Opinion Research in 1949, Samuel Stouffer of Harvard University Division of Social Relations, 
described polling as an ‘instrument of democracy’ (cited in Lee, 2007: 50).  
The development and expansion of opinion polling and attitude surveys during the 20th century 
certainly offered governments a new way of knowing about what members of the public thought 
about different issues of the day, however prominent sociologists including Jurgen Habermas 
(1989) and C. Wright Mills (2000) have argued that the polls also led to the transformation and 
political emasculation of the more active, engaged, deliberative ‘publics’ of the 18th, 19th and early 
20th centuries. Active publics were, Mills suggested, reimagined as ‘mass men[sic]’  as ‘abstracted 
empiricism’ in social research brought about the reduction of ‘sociological realities to psychological 
variables’ (Mills, 2000: 63) and the attempt to explain social phenomena in terms of individual 
preferences, beliefs and tendencies (Ibid: 67).  
In other words a significant amount of power became attached to a particular way of researching, or 
as constructionists would have it, producing ‘public opinion’. This power can be seen at work in the 
level of traction which ‘public opinion’ as produced using AGIP approaches, has within the 
contemporary political sphere. Traction can be observed both in the keen attention which 
politicians give to quantitative representations of the level of public support which they have on 
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particular issues, and in the way in which citizens of democracies now expect to be asked for their 
own ‘opinions’ in particular ways. 
In fact, the growth in the use of survey-administered instruments to measure or capture public 
opinion has led to a shift in the subjective orientations of the people whose opinions are to be 
captured: ‘people learn to have opinions; they become “opinioned”…people come to “fit” the 
demands of the research; they become, so to speak, persons that are by nature “researchable” from 
that perspective’ (Osborne and Rose, 1999: 392). People develop, in other words, an ‘opinionated 
habitus’, a set of dispositions which are compatible with dominant ways of knowing about public 
opinion (Bourdieu, 1984). The very fact that opinion polling questions are repeatedly asked, and 
their results repeatedly reported has ‘deeper cognitive effects on how people remember, envision, 
and think about public opinion and the public that has opinions’ (Beniger, 1992: 217).  
So, whilst no conception of ‘public opinion’ is  ‘real’ as such (in the sense that it pre-exists the 
human-made mechanisms through which it is brought into being) some conceptions can, through 
the traction they gain in the real-world, produce what Osborne and Rose (1999) have called ‘reality 
effects’. As such if we accept the constructionist view that different research approaches to public 
opinion emerge from different kinds of projects surely the most important question we need to ask 
ourselves is not ‘which project provides objective knowledge of ‘real’ public opinion?’ but rather 
‘which project imagines and produces public opinion in a manner which is most supportive of 
democracy?’. For deliberative democrats the answer to the latter question would surely be that 
deliberative methods are to be preferred to AGIP approaches. Why is it, then, that AGIP approaches 
have continued to dominate? Why have they been able to gain a level of ‘traction’ which 
deliberative approaches have not?  
The power of the polls 
The results generated by AGIP approaches to public opinion have been able to gain and maintain 
some traction on the ‘real world’ of politics for two reasons. Firstly, AGIP approaches are premised 
upon an objectivist epistemology which is compatible with the dominant conception of social 
science as episteme, or ‘scientific knowledge’ (see Flyvbjerg, 2001). This epistemic orientation is 
deeply embedded within what Latour (1993) has described as the ‘impossible purification’ 
engrained in the ‘modern Constitution’: Latour contends that the cultural grouping which he 
describes as ‘the Moderns’ have attempted to achieve an ‘impossible purification’ (Latour, 2004: 
167) by distinguishing ‘facts’ from ‘values’ and have ascended to a position of cultural dominance 
because they have succeeded in constructing a version of reality which assumes that the 
purification is complete. This ensures that our public sphere (at least in the Western world) is 
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oriented towards a conception of knowledge as objective, scientific, value-free (see also 
Habermas‘s notion of scientism: ‘science’s belief in itself: that is the conviction that we can no 
longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge 
with science’ (Habermas, 1987: 4)). AGIP approaches to public opinion, then, produce findings which 
conform to this ‘normal discourse’ (cf. Rorty, 1979) and therefore earn the right to be seen as 
‘knowledge’ or ‘science’1. 
Secondly, it is also plain that AGIP approaches produce knowledge about publics in a form which is 
congruent with the existing ‘voting-centric’ institutions of Western democratic states. Whilst these 
states have usually also institutionalised important democratic safeguards in the form of 
constitutions, independent judiciaries, the dispersal of power across different legislative branches 
and so on, there are good reasons to think that among the general population (and perhaps too 
amongst some politicians), a crude association between democracy and majoritarianism holds. The 
AGIP approach of the opinion survey is likely to have a face value appeal for a citizenry oriented to 
majoritarianism, comprised of individuals who have developed the ‘opinionated habitus’.  
What is categorically not the case, then, is that AGIP approaches have gained traction simply by 
producing more objective findings or being more ‘true’ to ‘reality’. Rather, traction is gained and 
maintained through the use of research methods which do not upset the apple cart of culturally 
dominant assumptions about what can count as knowledge, and about how citizens think and 
relate to (and should think and relate to) the political sphere. In short, AGIP approaches are 
reassuringly (for some) consonant with, and nurturing towards, the epistemological and political 
status quo. But for democrats this cannot be a valid reason for accepting that such methods should 
dominate.  
Social research becoming part of the bureaucracy 
Whether or not social scientists perceive themselves to be producing knowledge for knowledge’s 
sake, or to be intervening in meaningful ways in the society of which they are a part, is irrelevant to 
the actual status and import which their findings may eventually assume. The production of 
knowledge about how ‘the public’ feels and what it thinks and wants can never be something which 
is entirely removed from the sphere of politics. Such knowledge inevitably stakes some epistemic 
claim over the ‘public will’ and thus always has the potential to prompt and shape the conduct of 
those who purport to act in the name of democracy. What needs to be examined, then, is the extent 
to which the production of such knowledge, such purportedly democratic data, actually enhances 
the health of democracy, as opposed to merely masquerading as its faithful servant whilst serving 
                                                                    
1
 For a more detailed examination of how epistemically-oriented social science dominates see Turner, 2013. 
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the interests of particular groups (which might include the researchers who have staked their 
careers on this particular form of inquiry).    
Where governments themselves (as opposed to political parties) carry out, commission or explicitly 
attend to research on public opinion (or related phenomena such as public confidence, trust, 
satisfaction or preferences), then they are in some senses implying that in responding to that 
research they are not seeking political advantage, but rather they are discharging an administrative 
responsibility by maintaining oversight of the extent to which the bureaucratic apparatus 
commands public support and approval. Arguably, then, government-sponsored research on public 
opinions and preferences which takes place apart from the process of democratic debate and vote-
casting, itself becomes a component of, or at the very least a significant appendage to, the 
bureaucratic machinery of government. The experts involved in carrying out the research are 
granted ‘discretionary administrative power’ (Richardson, 2002: 3) to represent not only the 
opinions of the public but also, in some cases, the so-called ‘drivers’ of those opinions. In other 
words they have been granted the power to generate the knowledge which underpins the 
democratically essential ‘ongoing relationship’ between government and people (Ibid: 4-5).  
The discretionary ‘power’ granted to research experts in this regard may appear to end with 
representation as opposed to decisive action however such an interpretation ignores the 
‘governmental’ potential inherent in all knowledge production projects. Looked at from a 
governmentality perspective an examination of how truth is produced is essential for understanding 
how power is exercised and expressed, as governing a population is made possible through different 
ways of knowing (cf. Foucault, 1991).For example, in the specific area of criminal justice in England 
and Wales the development of a ‘target’ for criminal justice agencies to improve ‘public confidence’ 
in the criminal justice system as measured by the British Crime Survey (now Crime Survey of 
England and Wales) linked knowledge to action by blurring the lines between research and 
performance measurement. As such, attempts to understand the truth about ‘public confidence’ did 
not merely generate knowledge, they also functioned as part of a more encompassing ‘regime of 
practices’, generating a ‘domain of objects about which it is possible to articulate true or false 
propositions’ (Ibid: 79) and delimiting plausible responses to concerns about the relationship 
between the public and the criminal justice system. Truly, then, under these conditions, knowledge 
production becomes a part of the government bureaucracy.  
Towards a moral justification of the power of knowledge 
When social research becomes a part of the government bureaucracy the discretionary power it 
wields must be fully justified, not arbitrary, or it risks becoming a form of dominance (see 
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Richardson, 2002). It is important, then, to examine the grounds upon which particular methods for 
representing public opinion (which is to say bringing it into being) can be justified. I have already 
argued that AGIP methods cannot rely on assertions of epistemic superiority to justify their position 
of dominance. The form of ‘public opinion’ which they produce may have a certain practical appeal 
in a scientific culture which favours objectivity and a political culture oriented towards a 
majoritarian conception of democracy, but the products of AGIP surveys of ‘public opinion’ are no 
more ‘real’ than the products of deliberation. The alternative, which I hinted at right at the start of 
this article, is that we should adjudicate between approaches to researching ‘public opinion’ by 
examining how they produce public opinion, and whether they do so in a manner which is 
supportive of democracy, and the values which sustain it. In other words the power of knowledge, 
at least in the area of public opinion, must be justified in moral terms. 
Yet, as Richardson (2002: 7) notes: ‘insofar as we remain hazy about what the ideal of democracy 
requires of us, we will also remain ill prepared to protect and defend it’. It is beyond the scope of this 
article to develop a comprehensive account of what democracy is, or should be, and it is not 
necessary to do so in order to at least illustrate how we might begin to approach the task of 
providing a moral justification for different ways of knowing about public opinion. We might, for 
example, turn to democratic theory to propose that, in a democracy, citizens must be prepared to 
take into account each other’s reasons and arguments (see Richardson, 2002); or that they ought to 
be prepared to engage in dialogue which requires them to defend their preferences in terms of 
public- rather than self-interest (Dryzek, 2000: 46); or that they ought to engage in processes 
focused on ‘the transformation of private, self-regarding desire into public appeals to justice’ 
(Young, 2000: 51).  And we may want to note that sociologists have identified the tendency of AGIP 
public opinion research to help produce subjects who are ‘opinioned’ (Osborne and Rose, 1999), 
‘psychologised’ (Mills, 2000), atomised, individualised, consumerised, self-interested, and otherwise 
shaped by the dispositions of the ‘opinionated habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1984). None of these things 
would appear to be supportive of a society in which individuals are well-prepared for engaging with 
one another in a spirit of openness, setting aside self-interest and pursuing justice. As such, if these 
are the criteria we have chosen as the yardstick for moral defensibility then we might suggest that 
AGIP approaches do not serve as an ‘instrument of democracy’, rather they help to create a reality 
in which the orientations which support a healthy democracy are actively suppressed.    
So how do I bring this back to my original topic of reflecting upon ‘the plausibility of imagining that 
the expanded use of deliberative approaches to understanding public opinion might offer some 
respite from the apparent excesses of ‘penal populism’’? The point I have been trying to make is 
that by challenging the dominance of AGIP measures on the grounds that they produce data which 
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is equally ‘artificial’ with the data provided by deliberative polls it may be possible to make space on 
equal terms for alternative, particularly deliberative, ways of knowing about (or indeed producing) 
public beliefs, preferences, opinions, feelings and evaluations on matters of crime and criminal 
justice. Rejecting this epistemic understanding of social science may be a necessary precursor to the 
opening up (some might say democratising) of the landscape of method in order to build up and 
extend the influence of more democratically valuable approaches to knowing, which is to say those 
approaches to knowing which establish and nourish deliberatively-inclined publics, and which are 
therefore more morally justifiable than those methods (AGIP methods) which undermine the 
orientations and values which help a deeper form of democracy to flourish. 
It is highly likely (although by no means guaranteed) that the greater use of such methods will begin 
to unravel those forces which have combined to both make possible and incentivise ‘penal 
populism’ and underpin the drift towards ‘mass incarceration’. They will do this by making much 
more meaningful demands upon citizens than the mere requirement that they express an 
instantaneous (and most likely unreflective and socially-conditioned) evaluation or preference. 
Participation of this kind can help to keep citizens alert to some key aspects of the lived realities of 
groups with whom they may not otherwise come into contact on a regular basis, operating as a 
‘circulatory system keeping them alive to social reality’ (Dzur, 2012: 54). Deliberative engagements 
of this kind may be more likely to help to generate discourses which can challenge the malevolent 
shadow which is cast by the prison when it is regarded as the key institution for ensuring the 
maintenance of social order and justice.  
Perhaps just as importantly, such engagements will offer their participants an opportunity to reflect 
upon the different ways in which democracy is enacted, and the different ways in which the 
responsibilities of democratic citizenship can be understood. The real ‘value’ in deliberative 
methods, then, is not that they have the capacity to access a deeper, more ‘real’ or considered 
‘truth’ (they don’t, although they will produce a different version of truth), rather it is that they 
operate with a much fuller account of the potential and appropriate role of subjects as political 
agents. They therefore offer both a more democratically appealing vision of social scientific method 
and a more democratically responsible approach to the ontological productivity of social science. It 
is the latter point which makes it a matter of democratic urgency to move beyond the idea of the 
‘hypothetical public’ and acknowledge how deeply implicated social scientific activity is in the 
production and maintenance of democratic realities.  
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